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Closely Held Firms As Going Concerns

Michael S. Long
Rutgers University
Stephan E. Sefcik
University of Washington

INTRODUCTION
Good grief, Charley Brown! After almost 50 years of publication, you are not a going
concern but a mere extension of Charles Schultz. Who really cares whether Peanuts, a profitable
business for almost half a century is really a separate on-going entity or, as it turns out, not a
separate entity but merely an extension of its creator, Charles Schultz? As recently as six months
ago, it would have met the traditional definitional requirement for a going concern; it could be
expected to continue in operation into the foreseeable future. That going concern definition,
however, does not take into consideration whether a current on-going business exists that is
separate from the owner/manager, or as was the case with Peanuts, whether the business is
merely an extension of a self-employed person. In essence, it muddles the entity issue.
This current GAAP determination of a going concern is shortsighted for two important
reasons. The most important deals with creditors and other stakeholders involved with the
business. Do they enter into contracts with the business or with the individual owner/manager?
Currently, they contract with both since, in reality, they make no determination whether a
separate firm (entity) exists. The second deals with valuing a business. If the business is not
really a separate going concern, it would typically be valued as the sum of its individual assets
instead of the present value of its future cash flows. Many times when buying a business, the
acquirer is really just buying the assets to start his own business. This is particularly true in most
service businesses.
The purpose of this paper is to advocate reintroducing a qualification to the going concern
audit opinion when an entity separate from its owner/manager does not exist. Criteria for
determination are also proposed. Arguably, this will make audited accounting statements more
meaningful for closely-held firms. More important, this should produce information useful for
potential creditors and outside owners. Traditionally, banks have extended loans to small,
closely-held firms with only compiled statements; there was no need to provide audited
statements. However, the process of lending is changing from a direct, face-to-face process
between borrower and lender to an indirect one where credit scoring systems are used. Audited
statements can provide better, higher quality information to lenders extending credit.
Though not necessarily related to going concern status, a similar situation exists with
privately held firms having outside managers. Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2000) have a
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current working paper that finds executive compensation more closely related to sales than
profitability in privately-held, small corporations. Almost every compensation study, starting
with Lewellen and Huntsman's (1970) work over thirty years ago, finds compensation more
closely related to profitability than sales for public firms. But all public firms have audited
financial statements. Very few small, closely-held firms produce them. Since arguably,
revenues are more difficult to manipulate than profits, compensation for these firms seems to be
determined as a function of revenues. With outside managers in privately-held firms, audited
statements would allow them to better assess performance to determine compensation and
hopefully provide a better incentive to maximize shareholder value for the owners.
While the FASB and the SEC have focused on public firms, accounting rules have
become less relevant for closely-held businesses. Creditors have learned to make lending
decisions and outside owners have learned to evaluate performance without the benefit of audited
financial statements. Firms that could provide this attestation function have foregone a
significant revenue stream. Of course, major auditing firms are not affected as much because
most small, closely-held businesses use local or regional accounting firms. Ironically, at a time
when major, high- profile firms are promoting competition to identify the best-run small
businesses in local markets as possible sources of new revenue, they are not considering the
importance of directing GAAP to provide useful information for these closely held firms. It
appears as if these large firms are moving from the traditional auditing function to focus on the
more lucrative consulting business. Conceptually, accountants are not providing all the
information about the firm that they can; practically, accountants have forfeited their potential
auditing business with non-public firms which they could reclaim.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First we provide a review of GAAP
as related to the going concern and entity principles and then a review of the current literature as
related to these issues. Next, an argument is made and data presented on why audited financial
statements should be even more important today with changing lending practices. We then
suggest how GAAP could be revised to determine a going concern. Finally, we discuss what is
and is not a going concern under our criteria using an anecdotal example.
I. Current GAAP and Going Concern Status
A. Going Concern Definition
The most recent pronouncements on what constitutes a going concern are found in the
Statement on Auditing Standards, No. 59 (April 1988). This authoritative reference provides
guidance to the auditor conducting an audit of financial statements in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). It posits, in the second paragraph, that the auditor has
“...responsibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed one year beyond the
date of the financial statements being audited.” It notes in paragraph 4, that “...the auditor is not
responsible for predicting future conditions or events.” Apparently, this safe harbor provision
protects the auditor by noting that evaluation of a firm‟s going concern status is not the primary
goal or objective of the audit. Finally, note in paragraph 6, “Consideration of Conditions and
Events” where none of the topics covered relates to the owner/manager or any other key person
leaving the firm. Instead, it focuses on the usual problems that can cause a firm to discontinue
operating due to poor performance.
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Auditors, while aware of the going concern problem, never explicitly address the issue as
it relates to a specific individual. In searching traditional accounting literature, no information
was found relating going concern status to either a “key individual” or a continuation of the
current owner/manager. Historically, accountants have found no reason to worry about what
constitutes an “entity” when considering a going concern. The emphasis is entirely on future
performance.
B. Evidence on Going Concern Qualifications with Public Firms
Accounting makes the going concern principle the basis for many measurement and
valuation concepts such as the historical cost and revenue recognition assumptions. Many
studies have been undertaken to demonstrate the stock price effect of receiving a going concern
qualification on the financial statements. It appears to impart additional information to the
market for both security pricing and predicting future activity such as bankruptcy or delisting.
While these studies are all conducted on publicly-trade firms, one could expect similar inferences
from a study of closely-held firms.
Prior literature generally provides evidence that the going concern audit opinion provides
an early warning signal. Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler (1989) find that the qualified going
concern opinion provides incremental explanatory power in the context of a bankruptcy
prediction model. Kennedy and Shaw (1991) report that the qualified opinion is a significant
variable in explaining bankruptcy resolution (i.e., whether a company which files for bankruptcy
eventually liquidates or reorganizes). Another aspect of this literature investigates possible
reasons that underlie the auditor‟s error “on the other side.” These studies consider the decision
to issue a going concern opinion for a company that ultimately files bankruptcy (McKeown,
Mutchler and Hopwood, 1991). In this approach in a later article, Hopwood, McKeown and
Mutchler (1994) find no evidence that auditor‟s qualified going concern opinions are inferior
predictors of bankruptcy compared to traditional statistical models. Nogler (1995) follows
companies that receive qualified opinions through their resolution in terms of bankruptcy,
liquidation, merger or subsequent receipt of an unqualified opinion. He concludes the error rate
quoted in the literature that results from incorrectly giving firms qualified opinions is too high.
The broader question as to whether "subject to" audit qualifications provide information
content to capital market participants is a long-standing, though unresolved, research issue in the
financial accounting literature. However, effective with SAS 58 (AIPCA 1988), the Auditing
Standards Board eliminated the "subject to" audit opinion based, in part, on its view that it did
not convey incremental information to financial statement users. Arguably, it should be
reinstated.
Many studies examine whether the auditor‟s decision to modify his opinion in the
presence of material uncertainties is correlated with stock returns over time. They group together
a variety of "subject to" audit opinions including asset realization, litigation concerns, as well as
going concern issues. The earlier papers in this literature find little support for the information
content of these opinions (e.g., Ball, Walker and Whittred, 1979; Elliott, 1982; and Dodd,
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1984). Subsequent literature suggests that these audit
opinions affect stock returns in various contexts based upon whether the audit qualification
receives media coverage (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1986); whether the qualification is
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withdrawn (Loudder, Khurana, Sawyers, Cordery, Lowe, and Wunderle, 1992); or whether the
audit opinion dampens market reaction to subsequent earnings announcements (Choi and Jeter,
1992).
As noted by several of these authors, a variety of issues confound examination of the
information content of these opinions. Information content studies are basically empirical studies
of association (i.e., statistical dependency) between various independent (explanatory) variables
and stock price changes over some appropriate event window. There are empirical problems in
specifically identifying the event or announcement date with the release of accounting
statements. Then problems exist with concurrent news disclosures. Finally, the absence of a
suitable expectation model exists from which to discern the unexpected component of the
qualification.
Other papers focus only on the information content of the going concern opinion. Firth
(1978) finds for a sample of UK companies that the announcement of a qualified going concern
opinion is associated with negative stock returns (though his results have never been replicated).
Fleak and Wilson (1994) find that unexpected qualified going concern opinions are associated
with negative abnormal returns, but unexpected clean opinions do not produce positive abnormal
returns. Investigating both a qualified going concern report and subsequent bankruptcy (similar
to Choi and Jeter‟s (1992) approach), Chen and Church (1996) report that the presence of
qualified going concern status attenuates the market reaction to a subsequent bankruptcy filing.
More recently Willenborg and McKeown (1998) consider going concern opinions with
IPOs. They find approximately one quarter of all IPOs under $10 million have going concern
qualifications in their offering prospectus. Building this information incrementally into their
delisting model based upon other publicly available information, they find that the explanatory
power of the extended model is significantly increased. They also find that IPO firms with going
concern opinions suffer less first-day underpricing than similar IPOs without going concern
opinions. They conclude that having a going concern opinion reduces ex ante uncertainty for
investors. Their work motivates consideration of a broader definition of going concern for
closely-held firms.
These studies suggest that a qualified going concern opinion provides value-relevant
information for publicly traded firms. We could find no literature dealing with going concern
qualification in closely-held firms. All published studies dealt with the results of specific events'
(e.g., qualified opinions) effect on either the firm‟s stock price or subsequent bankruptcy or
delisting. While all are certainly logical research questions, research to date has failed to address
the issue of whether the audit (qualification) process provides useful information for creditors of
non-public firms. Unfortunately, no insight is provided into the going concern problem that we
posit: does a separate entity actually exist in a closely held enterprise and how can it be
recognized. We therefore consider some original research into whether others view separate
going concerns with closely-held firms.
II.

Going Concern Status of Closely Held Firms: A Lender's Perspective
Closely held firms rarely have audited financial statements. However, all banks lend
money to these firms, suppliers extend credit to them, and obviously employees work for them.
All without caring whether a separate going concern actually exists. This occurs, in good part,
because of no well-defined going concern concept for small, closely-held firms. In not
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considering that issue, accountants have defaulted on their responsibility to provide any
meaningful information about these firms' ability to survive in the future.
The standard argument for small firm owners when asked about audited financial
statements is why bother, lenders don‟t care. But lenders do care. They almost always require
that owner/managers personally co-sign loan agreements. After the owner/manager has
established a successful relationship with the lender, usually five to ten years later, new loans
will be made requiring only the “firm” to sign. Traditional finance arguments suggest agency
problems. The firm could shift risk after borrowing the funds or it could just forego positive net
present value investments by paying the money out to the owner/manager. While repeated
success with a customer definitely attests to his/her character, adverse incentives still remain.
However, after several successful loans, the firm has matured and now represents a going
concern to the bank. Any adverse incentive problems are with respect to the business and not its
owner/managers. Thus, the personal co-sign requirement is typically no longer necessary.
Direct evidence on going concern status is not available. However evidence is available on
lenders‟ requirements for borrowers. Specifically, we can view the portion of firms whose
owners are required to personally guarantee borrowing agreements. Overall, we find that a
significantly higher portion of firms with owner/managers are required to give personal
guarantees than are small firms with outside professional managers. Obviously, under our
definition of going concern, these would almost all qualify as separate entities. Secondly, we
find that older firms also have a lower portion of loans where personal guarantees are required.
These firms are more likely to have established themselves as separate going concerns
independent of their owner/managers.
Data we examine are taken from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance that
was jointly undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business
Administration. It provides detailed information on the types and sources of financial services
used by small businesses with emphasis on the use of credit. It contains information on collateral
including personal guarantees being required by the owners. The firms are also categorized by
type (proprietorship, partnership, corporation, and Subchapter S corporation) along with age and
other variables. A good review of this data can be found in Cole and Wolken (1995).
We consider only regular or “C” corporations because proprietorships and partnerships are
not really going concerns by almost any definition. A more difficult classification decision arose
for Subchapter S corporations. We felt that these firms, almost as large in number as “C”
corporations, do not really represent going concerns because of their limited number of
shareholders and the unanimous agreement required by shareholders to qualify as a Subchapter S.
However, it should be noted that we also examined the data including all corporations and
obtained qualitatively similar results.
We investigate the hypothesis that lenders can identify going concerns and are less likely to
require owners' personal guarantees on loans. The first characteristic that would qualify a small
corporation as a going concern is having an outside manager. There were 2662 loans reported as
“C” corporations. Coincidentally, exactly half or 1332 had owners‟ personal guarantees.
However, for the 1949 owner/manager firms, 52.2% had personal guarantees while the remaining
713 firms with outside managers had only 44% with personal guarantees. Under the hypothesis
of equal means, a binomial test indicates a significantly greater portion of loans to
owner/manager firms required personal guarantees.
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Our next test looks at whether the age of the firms makes a difference. We investigate the
hypothesis that older firms are more likely to be going concerns. Over time, stakeholders start to
identify more with the firm than its owner. For owner/manager firms, only 1142 loans are from
firms reporting an age of greater than 10 years. Of these, 581 (or 50.9%) require personal
guarantees. For the younger firms‟ 807 loans, 437 (or 54.2%) require the guarantee. While this
difference is not as great as that between insider and outside management, it is still significantly
different. Thus, consistent with our suggestion, it appears lenders are currently capable of
identifying going concerns.
Why should accountants worry whether or not a going concern exists? The attestation
function basically confirms that financial statements are fairly and consistently presented.
Potential lenders use this data to assess risk in order to make informed financing decisions.
Smaller firms rarely produce audited financial statements unless required. In cases of no audit,
the financier must develop his own criteria for determining the going concern status and credit
worthiness of the applicant.
The importance of accurate, relevant, and timely financial information can be expected to
grow over time. Traditionally, small firms developed a close relationship with their banker that
lasts for years. Bankers accumulate private information on these closely held firms that allowed
them to make informed decisions. Closely held firms obtain financing without having to disclose
their financial data to the public. However these relationships are changing now. With the recent
merger activity in the banking industry, the small, closely-held firm finds its "personal" banker
continuously changing. Banks routinely transfer managers from branch to branch making long
term relationships built on trust and private information more difficult to maintain. Conversely,
smaller firms, for their part, are now more likely to have less loyalty to their banker and more
likely to shop around to obtain the best loan terms. The use of objective and verifiable
information that includes audited financial statements will become more important.
Loan shopping reaches its extreme with the uniform conditions for granting small
business loans. Wells Fargo has a program to extend $100,000 of credit to closely held firm
owners through a standard application form somewhat similar to a car loan application. Forms
are credit scored and the loan decision is made automatically. The securitization or pooling of
loans to small businesses is also becoming common. For this line of business to expand and
reach its potential requires reliable and consistent data. Arguably, this will require identifying
which firms are really separate going concerns and which are merely extensions of their
owner/manager entrepreneurs. Again, a clearer line in establishing what is a going concern
becomes relevant.
In a recent paper related to small firm business lending, Petersen and Rajan (2000)
look at the "distance" of small firm borrowers from their lenders. Using the same National
Survey of Small Business Finance data, they found small firms are now significantly further in
geographic proximity from their sources of funds. They point out that informational
transparency, or the ability to evaluate the firm‟s credit quality at low cost, will lower the cost of
lending to the firm. We feel that audited financial statements are one way to provide certified
information to lenders. This data can be interpreted with confidence with respect to its accuracy
and fairness. Further, it does not necessitate physical visits or personal contacts by the lender that
would traditionally be required as due diligence for loans to small, closely-held firms. The
federal government is one lender that has historically required audited financial statements before
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making loans. In programs like the Small Business Administration (SBA), higher accounting
standards are enforced. Further, the SBA is aware of the weakness in the going concern
verification for small firms. They require owners on any equity position to co-sign the loan; not
just the principal owners required in private arrangements. This requirement and the senior
position of their debt greatly restricts firms' financing options; particularly their ability to
undertake additional financing in the future. As an aside, the government guaranteed portion of
these loans, typically 80% of the amount borrowed, is already being securitized and resold. It is
entirely likely that the other 20% will be pooled and also sold in the future.
III. Does A Going Concern Exist?
When valuing closely held firms, the first consideration is whether a separate “going
concern” actually exists. For a large firm, going concern refers to whether the entity is solvent
and can continue to exist in the immediate future as currently structured. With a closely held
firm, emphasis is changed from potential survivability in the future to whether an independent
business exists that is separate or separable from its current owner/managers. Thus, the relevant
issue becomes whether the current business can continue to exist with a significant change in
ownership. In many cases, closely held firms are not separate entities from their owners. The
business is merely an extension of the entrepreneur or person who developed the entity or “firm”
over time. It most likely is structured as a separate firm for legal and/or tax reasons. However,
with a change in ownership, a different business may emerge. Prior to the owner/manager being
replaced, it can be very difficult to determine whether a separate business exists, but such a
determination is required to know how the business should be valued.
The following two criteria are posited for a closely held firm to be considered a separate,
on-going entity from its current owner/managers. First, will the firm continue to operate as it is
currently structured if the current owner/manager is replaced? That is, if the owner were
replaced, would there truly be a continuity of business or would a new business be formed using
the old assets. Many small firm sales are really the restructuring of old assets into a new
enterprise. You purchase a farm to become a farmer, a cab medallion to become a taxi driver, or
a seat on the stock exchange to become a trader. These are all new businesses that require
specific assets to enter the field. These assets are basically sellable property rights and do not
represent specific ongoing businesses.
The second test considers the perspective of the various stakeholders that deal with the
business. Do the customers or suppliers view themselves as dealing with the business or with its
current owners? For example, consider an accounting business. An independent accountant has
her firm name on the door, Small Business Solutions, Joan Smith, CPA. She has an office staff
and several junior people working for her. This business is merely an extension of Joan. She
may, in fact, have valuable assets to sell when she retires, including her current customer list and
a well trained staff and organization. However, the new buyers must establish themselves as a
going concern. Clients probably would consider their new accountant to be a different firm even
if the same name were retained. Contrast this with a large firm. Assume that your accountant is
Arthur Andersen. While you may deal with a specific individual, you know that when he or she
leaves, their replacement will be of similar quality (education, training, and experience). Further,
users of your financial statements look at Arthur Andersen to establish credibility and not the
specific partner who signs the statements. One reason the market is willing to pay a higher rate
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for Big 5 assurance services is because users of their financial statements know the firm and its
reputation and do not have to consider the quality and integrity of the individual accountant.
If a firm passes both tests, it should be valued as an ongoing business. Even though
changes will be made in the firm after it is sold, the valuation process should start by evaluating
current cash flows and assuming that the enterprise will continue into the future even if
operations are conducted by new individuals and under new leadership/management.
A firm failing to pass either test should be valued instead as the sum of the specific assets
being sold. These assets could be either tangible or intangible. In rural areas, farmland is priced
for its location (bottomland or upland) by the acre. Similarly, specific intangible assets such as a
cab medallion or a seat on a security exchange are also priced differently depending on city
location or stock exchange. Quite often, current prices are published in local newspapers. These
are identifiable specific assets.
Conceptually similar, but more difficult to measure, is buying a service business such as a
medical, legal, accounting, or consulting practice. What is actually being acquired? An existing
office, some staff, or possibly just some used equipment. But what is really being paid for is the
chance to see and hopefully impress most of the current customers once. If they do not like you,
they will shop elsewhere. You and your expertise are the product. This is why you cannot value
the business as a going concern.
IV. Real Examples of Going Concern Determination
The previous examples were meant to suggest straightforward decisions. The actual
distinction between a going concern and a non-going concern can be somewhat arbitrary. For
that matter, the delineation between a going concern and a self-employed entrepreneur is also
murky. One purpose of this paper is to flag the importance of making a going concern
determination based upon more than the future profitability of old owners. In the next section,
some real examples of what is and what is not a going concern are provided. Then an example of
a business that at first glance would appear to be a going concern but, in fact, turns out not to be,
is provided.
A. The CEO is Important But Not the Entire Factor
Ford Motor Company is obviously a going concern even though the Ford family controls
40% of the voting stock and their chairman of the board is William Clayton Ford, Jr., who is the
founder‟s great grandson. Similarly, consider a newer firm whose founder‟s name is not on the
door: Microsoft and Bill Gates. If Mr. Gates suddenly dies from a car accident, the market value
of the company Microsoft would undoubtedly suffer. Does this mean that Microsoft is not a
going concern? Of course not. It just shows that Mr. Gates is a highly valued, key employee.
Or, what about Mike Bloomberg who controls the privately held Bloomberg News Service?
While his demise would cause great problems, one would still consider Bloomberg News as a
going concern.
Moving along the continuum to a more personal relationship, consider Lutece, a four star
restaurant in New York City, owned by Andre Soltner. Recently, a valuation was undertaken for
a possible sale. The valuation was done two ways: with and without Mr. Soltner continuing on
as chief chef. Since customers of a restaurant of this caliber view the chef as the major
determinant of its quality, it becomes questionable whether a going concern exists without him.
This relevant accounting issue is not just whether the current owner/manager is valuable to the
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business, but whether the business is separable or even capable of being valued without him.
One test that is not considered in determining a going concern is how it's actually
organized legally. The current owner/managers organize their firms to minimize certain types of
costs. These include transaction costs to establish the business, its potential liability exposure,
and the joint firm and individual tax exposure. While most proprietorships and regular
partnerships would not qualify as going concerns under our definition, others would. This would
include many Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), or in some states, Limited Liability
Partnerships (LLPs). Most LLCs both have a limited life (30 year maximum) and are
reorganized if there is an ownership change. LLCs can be taxed as either a corporation or a
partnership. Some are going concerns under our criteria while others are not. Conversely, many
small corporations are merely the extension of the owner/manager‟s self-employment.
Conceptually, the corporate form has a continuous life, but for valuation purposes most small
closely held corporations should be viewed as facing a finite investment horizon.
B. Florida Retirement Lifestyles and the Going Concern
What happened to Florida Retirement Lifestyles provides a good example of what
constitutes a going concern under our definition. As Hoffman (1998) reported, about 30 years
after its founding in 1946, Dyeann and Richard Dummer purchased what became Florida
Retirement Lifestyles. Starting in the mid-1970's, Florida became an extremely popular place for
people to retire. Mobile Home Living, which was the magazine‟s original name, evolved into
Florida Retirement Lifestyles. It was riding the crest of that trend. Despite some lean times, the
Dummers have converted a weekly tabloid into a glossy magazine that appears 10 times a year.
In July 1996, they produced their banner issue for the 50,000-circulation voice of the
Sunshine State‟s retirement community. The 86 pages featured a home-buying guide for retirees
and brimmed with real-estate ads. More importantly, it generated almost $100,000 in revenues
which was a record for a single issue according to the Dummers. The demographic trend in the
burgeoning retirement population points to continued growth for the publication and even greater
revenues in the future.
Is this magazine a going concern under our definition, or merely an extension of the
Dummers? First, can one expect the business to continue as it is currently structured if the
owner/manager is replaced? It appears as if this firm could continue without much interruption.
It has been in business over 50 years and has already gone through one change of ownership.
Second, do customers (and other stakeholders) view their interactions with the business, or
magazine, as dealing with the firm or with the Dummers? The purchasers of the magazine buy it
for content not because of who publishes it. Similarly, advertisers consider the audience of the
magazine and not the specific publisher, when they purchase advertising space.
The potential of this magazine also caught the attention of William A. Campbell, then 55,
who had recently relocated near Fort Lauderdale. While previously a financial planner with no
publishing experience, Campbell saw great potential in the magazine business. He spotted a
favorable demographic trend in the growing retirement population and purchased the magazine
from the Dummers for an undisclosed sum. Campbell integrated Florida Retirement Lifestyles
with two other smaller publications he had bought earlier, hoping to lower overall expenses such
as circulation and accounting.
The issue, from our perspective, is whether Campbell bought a going concern in Florida
Retirement Lifestyles or just a title (and circulation list) to make into his own magazine. The
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going concern classification is most important at the time of a major financing and/or ownership
change. One indication that the transaction involved a going concern was that the magazine‟s
editor continued on with the new owner, Campbell. He was very encouraged as Campbell
upgraded the journalistic standards of the magazine, disdaining “puff pieces.” Campbell also
spent heavily on graphics and content assuming that improved quality would increase the sale of
advertising space which was the primary source of revenues.
Changing a business after its purchase does not, by itself, indicate it was or was not a
going concern. What matters is various parties‟ perspectives at the time of a restructuring or
sale. In this business, the major stakeholders were employees and advertisers. While the
employees were content with the change, advertisers had reservations. The Dummers, who were
no longer involved with the business, were outstanding salespeople. They had produced a
product that pleased their advertisers. However, the key to determining the going concern status
of this business is neither the Dummers' sales talents nor Campbell‟s strategic decisions. The key
is what the stakeholders thought. In an Inc. magazine article, Steve Wallschlaeger, general
manager of the retirement community Hacienda Del Rio in Edgewater, Florida, states… “We‟ve
known the Dummers for years. When they left, the magazine left with them.” It is not surprising
that advertising revenues dropped way off. As a result, if Mr. Wallschlaeger‟s view is a
representative quote, no going concern existed with this magazine when it changed hands.
One year to the month after the banner issue that initially caught Campbell‟s attention, his
publishing business filed for bankruptcy. The business reported assets of $98,089 and liabilities
of $557,712. Two months later, Campbell filed personal bankruptcy owing more that $800,000
to 32 creditors. His largest single debt was owed to the Dummers who had financed his purchase
of their magazine. If the business had been identified as a non-going concern and was viewed as
inseparable from its owners, it is quite likely Mr. Campbell would have considered the purchase
more carefully and quite possibly avoided bankruptcy.
While anecdotal, these stylized facts for a closely held business and its purchase highlight
issues that must be considered before making a major financing or acquisition decision.
Obviously, every situation will be different. However, specific rules to determine a going
concern, while difficult to articulate, are not impossible to establish.
V. Conclusions
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) apply to more than just publicly
traded firms. Further, information's relevance should be measured by more than security market
price reactions. The growing financial markets for lending are now securitizing loans for small,
closely held firms. Lenders and borrowers are further separated geographically than ever before
making personal visits by lenders more difficult if not problematic. Audited accounting
statements could provide important information in that process. However, this would require a
change in standard-setting trends for GAAP as well as the attitudes of accounting firms towards
this possible new area for business generation.
As a neglected criteria in this shift, we consider the going concern principle. As it now
stands going concern status is based entirely on a firm‟s ability to continue existence as it is
currently operating. No thought is given as to whether a going concern would even exist if a
sudden change in its principle owner/manager occurred. This is obviously an important piece of
critical information for potential creditors. We propose two criteria to determine whether a
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separate going concern exists. Will the firm continue to exist if its owner/manager is replaced?
Do customers and other stakeholders view themselves as dealing with a separate entity or just the
owner/manager? Reinstating a going concern qualification in the attestation process, especially
for small, closely-held firms, will provide useful information for potential creditors and shed
light on this contentious valuation issue.
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